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Abstract: The reported catastrophic failures of power systems 
from different geographical parts of the world often point to 
cascading outage events of system elements that eventually had 
led to system blackout. Although the initiating events of these 
cascading failures may, at times, be avoidable by vegetation 
management or proper protection settings, the occurrence of such 
an event as well as the eventual impact cannot always be 
predicted.  There is much debate in the industry whether the 
operator has enough time to apply countermeasures to avoid 
blackouts. Besides, the process of determining effective 
countermeasures cannot be deemed accurate unless a system has 
been extensively studied for the occurrence of widespread 
blackouts. In this paper, methods to create different cascading 
failure scenarios are developed under credible contingency 
conditions. The methods are tested on the 118 bus test system 
and several cases are reported. 
 
Keyword: Catastrophic failure, blackout, cascading outages, 
countermeasures, system vulnerability. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
N August 14th, shortly after a 650 MW power plant in 
Ohio failed, a 1200 MW capacity transmission line in the 
same state tripped, thus starting a series of cascading 
events that eventually led to the worst blackout in US history 
[1]. Uncontrolled system conditions had led to several power 
plants being tripped forcing power to flow through overloaded 
regional lines, which in turn, tripped to avoid damage. 
Large scale blackouts are relatively rare.  However, 
instances where blackouts have involved multiple areas point 
to certain features are insightful and educational. An analysis 
of recent blackout events [2]-[6], reveals an interesting theme: 
June 1998 - A severe lightning storm in Minnesota initiated a 
series of events, causing a system disturbance that affected 
the entire Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Region and the 
northwestern Ontario Hydro system of Northeast Power 
Coordinating Council. Lightning struck a 345 kV line in 
Minnesota and system protection de-energized the line. Some 
underlying lower voltage lines became overloaded and were 
tripped by protective devices.  Lightning caused the removal 
of a second 345 kV line and the remaining lower voltage 
transmission lines in the area were automatically removed 
from service. This successive removal of lines from service 
continued until the entire northern MAPP Region was 
                                                          
1The authors are with the Electrical & Computer Engineering Department at the 
University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, MO 65409. 
separated from the Eastern Interconnection, forming three 
islands and resulting in the eventual blackout of the 
northwestern Ontario Hydro system. 
March 1999 – A zone 3 relay tripped a 440 kV line in Sao 
Paulo, Brazil, resulting in cascading outages of several plants 
and high voltage ac and dc lines finally leading to a total 
blackout affecting 75 million people. 
1997 – An ice storm in Quebec, Canada downed transmission 
lines and blacked out much of New England, USA. 
July 1996 – A falling tree branch in Idaho led to a cascading 
failure of several power plants and transmission lines blacking 
out 18 western states in the US. 
August 1996 - all major transmission lines between Oregon 
and California were dropped affecting 10 western states. 
It is clear that transmission lines form a major link in the 
cascading failure phenomenon. Although, the reasons for line 
failure may be overloading, faulty protection setting, 
overgrown vegetation, or any other unpredictable system or 
weather condition, a line failure is often associated with 
growing system oscillations, voltage or transient instability. 
A power system is resilient enough that it can easily 
recover from a single element outage or malfunctioning. Thus 
individual blackouts are generally triggered by random events 
ranging from multiple equipment failures and bad weather to 
vandalism. The blackouts then typically become widespread 
through a series of cascading events. 
In order to understand the mechanisms of wide area blackouts 
brought about by cascading element failures in interconnected 
power systems, a study was undertaken with the primary goal 
of forcing the system under study to the brink of collapse. The 
overall objectives of this paper may be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Determine the vulnerability of a system to a blackout. 
Although, there is no single indicator of system 
vulnerability. One may study the generation levels as 
compared to their individual capability curves, the line 
loading levels as compared to their overloading limit, MW 
and MVar reserves available, system loadability and 
stability margins under critical single and multiple 
contingencies, etc. These indicators may be used to 
develop a composite risk level that measures the 
vulnerability of the system. In general, the following 
minimum information is required to develop such a 
measure: 
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a. System pre-condition – loading and generation 
levels, congestion points, voltage profile 
b. Post-contingency condition 
c. Availability of control actions 
2. Determine the sequence of events that lead to a 
blackout. To create this sort of cascading events, one 
has to simulate a disturbance, then wait for the 
system to attempt to settle down, then simulate a 
second disturbance and a third, or fourth and so on to 
make the system fail to converge to a post-
disturbance equilibrium. 
 
Simulating cascading failures in large power systems is 
always a difficult task. An insight may be gained by carefully 
studying a medium-sized system that provides enough 
complexity to study a slew of possibilities, including the 
effect of interarea tie-line congestion, the presence of weak 
lines in high load areas, limited generating capacities in 
certain areas, etc. 
II.  THE 118-BUS TEST SYSTEM 
A.  System diagram and operating conditions 
The IEEE 118 bus test system, shown in Fig. 1 is used for 
testing the cascading outage schemes. Four principle areas are 
defined in the system as shown in the diagram. 
 
Fig. 1.  The 118-bus test system. 
 
As a first step, it was desirable to identify the following 
topological conditions as well as some operating conditions of 
the system: 
- Location of large generators and generation reserves 
- Location of large loads 
- Loading levels and capacity on tie-lines 
- Loading levels on major transmission corridors 
- Pre-disturbance voltage profile of system 
- Location of high capacity transformers that connect 
to the higher voltage levels. 
- Location of distributed generations 
- Major flowgates 
 
Table 1 shows the interconnections flowgates in the system. It 
is obvious that the transfer capability between areas 1 and 3 is 
the least among all area interchanges. Therefore any system 
condition that creates a stress on these tie lines may be cause 
for concern. 
 
It may also be noted that Area 4 has inadequate generation to 
serve its native load and imports heavily from Area 3. Area 4 
is only interconnected to Area 3. Thus, export limitation from 
Area 3 to Area 4 may be a cause for concern. 
TABLE 1 INTERCONNECTION FLOWGATES IN THE 118-BUS TEST SYSTEM 
   Area Connection      Line Connection Capacity
From Area To Area From Bus To Bus  MVA
49 42 272
1 2 65 38 258
34 43 42
1 3 72 24 27
70 24 31
69 70 164












III.  CREATING CASCADING COLLAPSE CASES 
The power system is tested for overloads due to various 
contingencies. Only line outages are considered as 
contingencies. Generator outages or other dynamic problems 
are not considered. Since lines have limited capacity to carry 
power, they can easily get overloaded if the power flow on the 
tripped lines is redistributed through them. This can cause 
further deterioration of the overall health of the system if 
those overloaded lines are also tripped. 
Single line contingency screening was carried out 
initially. Less than a quarter of the tested contingencies 
caused a serious overloading problem. The extent of 
overloading was used as a criterion for deciding further 
outages in the system. This process highlighted the specific 
path followed by a failure. In most of the cases, there were a 
number of lines which got overloaded. Sometimes it may 
happen in a real system, that the highest loaded line may 
survive and a different line may trip due to different 
protection settings. This possibility was considered in some 
cases, whenever there were a large number of overloads. In 
most cases, the selection of the specific line to be outaged 
merely effects the number of steps in which the system 
progresses towards collapse. 
Out of all the possible single line contingencies, 37 
contingencies were identified as a set of potentially dangerous 
contingencies. However, many of them result in a failure 
because they cause islanding of certain buses. Out of the 37 
contingencies, we identified only 12 contingencies for further 
study. The results of this analysis are presented in the 
following sections. It can be observed that some of these 
contingencies caused wide-spread overloads, some scenarios 
only created overloads that were limited to just one particular 
area in the system while some resulted in overloading of 
interarea tie-lines. Some of these short listed outages and their 
impact are discussed in the next section. 
A.  Outage of line 4-5 
Outage of the line seems to be a comparatively wider 
problem encompassing the northwestern part of Area-1. Line 
4-5 connects a generator and a load at bus 4 to bus 5. Outage 
of this line causes overloading of line 5-11, which in turn 
causes overloads in lines 5-6, 6-7 and 7-12 as shown in Fig. 2. 
Bus 7 has a small load and bus 12 has a moderately sized 
generator. Taking out line 7-12, causes major overloads in 
lines 3-5 and line 16-17. This is because the generator at bus 




Fig. 2.  Initial effect of the outage of line 4-5 in the 118-bus test system. 
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Line 3-5 is again one of the lines that connect the buses in 
northwest part of Area-1 to the transformer at 5-8. Taking line 
3-5 out causes a large number of major overloads. Now the 
troubled region extends towards the centre of Area-1. Lines 8-
30 and 16-17, which get overloaded in the process, are 
crucial. They both connect the northwestern part of Area-1 
and the crucial transformer at bus 17. 
Taking out line 16-17 further overloads the same lines are 
previously overloaded. Also, line 17-15 is now used to route 
power to the northern region and hence gets overloaded. This 
worsens the condition in the entire area. Line 14-15 gets 
enormously overloaded (681 %). Overloads also spread over 
entire Area-1. Lines 15-33, 33-37 and 15-19 bring power from 
the eastern region of Area-1 which is connected to Area-2. 
Lines 21-22, 22-23 deliver power from south to north. 
Finally, taking out line 14-15 causes the system to fail. 
This scenario essentially limits the power delivered by 
transformer 5-8 to the north-western part of Area-1. Due to 
the initiating failure, the power flow is routed via line 8-30 
and transformer 30-17. In the process the lines which carry 
power from transformer 30-17 get overloaded. Further outage 
of these lines signals trouble. 
B.  Outage of line 38-65 
Line 38-65 is one of the important tie-lines between Area-1 
and Area-2. Quite understandably, it is also one of higher 
capacity lines in the system. Outage of this line forces power 
through other area interconnections. This line connects a very 
large generator at bus 65 to the transformer at bus 38. Area-1 
is a net importer of power and line 38-65 delivers a 
considerable amount of power to Area-1. In absence of this 
line, other area interconnections share the burden. Inter-
connection between Area-1 and Area-3 is made up of two 
lines (24-70 and 24-72). Both these lines get overloaded as 
seen in Fig. 3. In the northern part, lines connecting buses 40, 
41, 42, 39 are affected. Also line 34-43 and 43-44 which are 
responsible for inter-area power transfer impacted. The only 
noteworthy flow reversal is in line 23-24. Real power now 
flows from bus 24 to bus 23.  
Outage of a second line – that between buses 23 and 24, 
limits the power that can be transferred from Area-3 to Area-
1. Thus effectively two tie lines are lost which could supply 
power to Area-1. This puts the burden on Area-2 to supply to 
Area-1 through tie line 34-43. Line 43-44 delivers power to 
this link. This line is highly overloaded. Also, lines 39-40 and 
37-40 act as the northernmost tie line. This line mainly draws 
power from lines 40-41, 40-42 and 41-42. All these lines are 
affected after this outage. Not many reversals in direction of 
power flow are observed. This is because even in a healthy 
state, Area-1 draws power from other areas. 
 
Fig. 3.  Initial effect of the outage of line 38-65 in the 118-bus test system. 
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If line 43-44 is tripped, then there is only one corridor for 
power transfer between Area-1 and Area-2. Area-3 is already 
cut off from Area-1. Thus, only the north most inter-
connection gets burdened with the responsibility to cater to 
some loads in Area-1. Area-1 has heavy loads close to this 
inter-connection. Now power is drawn from central and 
eastern part of Area-2. In the process lines 40-41, 40-42, 41-
42, 39-40, etc. get overloaded. Line 40-41 is the highest 
overloaded line. Also very strong lines like 42-49 also get 
overloaded while supplying power to this inter-connection. 
Power is ultimately drawn for the swing bus. This shows the 
wide-spread effect of the contingency. 
Outage of line 40-41 worsens the situation in Area-2. The 
system is held together by just the north most inter-
connection. It is on the verge of being divided into two halves. 
Lines 40-41 and 41-42 are equivalent to a single parallel line 
to line 40-42. So, outage of line 40-41 causes overloading of 
line 40-42. The extent of overloading on previously 
overloaded lines increases further. Notable lines are 42-49, 
47-69 and 49-69. Line 42-49 is a strong double line and still it 
gets overloaded. Also, the transformer at 65-66 gets 
overloaded.  This shows the severity of power flows. 
Outage of line 40-42 completely cuts off Area-1 from the 
rest of the system. Technically this can classify as islanding, 
but it actually creates two big islands. This scenario shows the 
nature of interaction between area inter-connections.  
C.  Outage of line 64-65 
Line 64-65 connects a transformer at 65-66 to another 
transformer at 61-64. It is a crucial line in Area-2. In steady-
state condition, this line carries power from bus 65 to bus 64. 
The pre-outage line flow is very heavy. The reason behind 
such a large power flow is that a large load exists at bus 59 
(277MW, 113 MVar). This load is being supplied by this west 
to east power transfer. 
Line 64-65 takes power from the large generators at bus 
65 and bus 66 and delivers it to the eastern part of Area-2. 
This area has major loads at buses 59, 60 and 61. Outage of 
line 64-65 causes overloads on line 62-66 and line 62-67 as 
seen in Fig. 4. These are two alternative paths for taking 
power to the eastern region of Area-2. Power is also seen to 
flow to the North and then to the East and finally looping back 
to the South so as to serve these major loads. Thus immediate 
overloading occurs on lines 62-66 and 62-67. No significant 
changes in direction of power flow are noticed. 
 
Fig. 4.  Initial effect of the outage of line 64-65 in the 118-bus test system. 
 
A second outage - that of line 62-67, then eliminates one 
of the two remaining paths for delivering power directly from 
the western to the eastern region of Area-2. This outage shifts 
the flow on line 62-66. It also causes a flow from South to 
North in Area-2. This power further flows towards the East 
and loops back to the South. As a result, lines 50-57, 54-56, 
56-57, etc. get overloaded. This outage also overloads the 
transformer at 65-66. 
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Now, an outage of line 63-66 eliminates any possibility of 
West-East power transfer in Area-2. In order to serve the 
heavy loads at buses 59, 60, 55, 56, etc., power now flows 
from South to North in Area-2. For example - the power now 
flows from 66 to 49 to 50/51 to 57/58 to 56 to 55 to 59. As a 
result the lines which run South-North get overloaded. Even 
some of the lines such as 47-49 which run West-East 
contribute to this flow and get overloaded in the process. 
Almost all the lines which are connected to bus 49 get 
overloaded. This is so, because bus 49 is the junction from 
where power can flow to North and then to East. Line 49-54 is 
overloaded in spite of being a strong double line. Line 54-59 
shows a reversal in the direction of real power flow. It now 
supplies power from bus 54 to bus 59. Earlier, bus 59 was 
drawing power from the transformer at 64-61. Line 56-58 
which carries power from South to North is the most heavily 
loaded line. 
Outage of line 56-58 limits the South-North flow to an 
extent. This causes overloads in lines carrying power from the 
western region of Area-2 to the eastern region. Line 54-56 is 
one of them. Other lines which carry power from South to 
North are further overloaded. Lines which were previously 
overloaded are now at dangerously high overload levels. Also, 
the transformer at 65-66 is overloaded. Both these buses have 
major generations. Line 54-56 is the highest overloaded line. 
As a next step, outage of line 54-56 limits the West-East 
power flow that ultimately flows towards bus 59, 60, 55 and 
56, which have heavy loads. Line 54-55 is the only line which 
can accomplish this West-East flow. Also, most of the power 
is drawn from lines which run South-North. In the process, all 
lines running North from bus 49 get overloaded. The extent of 
overloading in the South-North lines reaches dangerous 
levels. 
Outage of a further line, that between buses 54 and 55 
leaves only one option for the power transfer: 49 to 51 to 57 
to 56 to 59. This path gets highly overloaded. Line 56-57 is 
the weakest line amongst these lines. Naturally this line is the 
highest overloaded line. All the previously overloaded lines 
experience a more severe overload. 
If line 56-57 is now tripped, then the system reaches a 
blackout state. 
D.  Outage of line 89-92 
Line 89-92 is a very strong connection between a major 
generator at bus 89 and a large load at bus 92. Outage of this 
line does not have a wide-spread effect on the network in 
Area-3 since a second circuit exists to the load at bus 92. This 
second circuit does get overloaded. The North-South 
connection 82-83 also gets overloaded as seen in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5.  Initial effect of the outage of line 89-92 in the 118-bus test system. 
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Line 82-83 is located in the southern part of Area-3. Outage 
of this line further overloads line 91-92 which serves a large 
load at bus 92. 
Outage of line 91-92 put the burden on other lines that 
can bring in power to this region. Lines 94-100 and 100-101 
serve this purpose and are therefore overloaded.  
If line 100-101 is outaged, then the overloading occurs 
over a wider region in Area 3. Line 94-100 is now more 
severely overloaded. 
Outage of line 94-100 causes a wide-spread problem in 
this region of Area-3. Line 95-96 is the highest overloaded 
line. Most of the lines are not severely overloaded at this 
point. 
Outage of line 95-96 increases the extent of overloading 
in the previously overloaded lines. As a result, line 94-96, 
which acts like a parallel path to line 94-96 is dangerously 
overloaded. Outage of this line causes a blackout. 
E.  Outage of transformer 37-38 
The transformer 37-38 is located in the eastern part of 
Area-1. The outage events caused by this contingency seem to 
be limited to this particular region. But overloading occurs 
over a wider area. This transformer receives power from 
Area-2 and delivers it to Area-1. This makes its location 
critical. Outage of this transformer hampers the ability of the 
system to serve the heavy loads in Area–1. This outage 
ultimately affects a wide portion of the system. 
The outage of transformer 37-38 overloads line 15-33 
which serves heavy load at buses 15 and 33. There is a cluster 
of heavy loads at buses 18, 19, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 39. All 
these loads are geographically close. Thus outage of the 
transformer at 37-38 overloads these lines. Line 15-33 carries 
power mostly from the generators in Area-1. This outage also 
overloads lines 40-42 and 43-44 in Area - 2. which bring in 
power to Area -1 as shown in Fig. 6. Also, a reversal of real 
power flow is observed in line 19-34. Power now flows from 
bus 19 to bus 34. 
Outage of line 15-33 causes overloading over a wider 
region. Line 19-34 serves the same purpose as line 15-33. 
Hence, it takes the brunt of losing line 15-33. Line 19-34 now 
brings as much power from Area-1 generators as possible. 
Naturally, line 19-34 is the highest overloaded line after this 
outage. Heavy power transfer ensues between buses 19 and 
34. Two lines in Area-2 which are close to Area-1 get 
dangerously overloaded. Line 39-40 is an area tie line which 
gets overloaded. 
Outage of line 19-34 has a tremendous impact on almost 
all lines in the northwestern and most of the western part of 
Area-2. Due to limited transmission capacity, Area-1 
generators can no longer supply the heavy loads at buses 18, 
19, 33, 34, 35, 36, etc. As a result, more power is fetched 
from Area-2 and the inter-area tie lines get overloaded. 
 
Fig. 6.  Initial effect of the outage of transformer 37-38 in the 118-bus test system. 
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The extent of overloading is dangerously high. Line 37-40 is 
one of the area interconnections. It also shows reversal of 
power flow after this outage. The same is the case for line 39-
40. Line 34-43 is the only inter-area connection between 
Area-1 and Area-2 that is not connected to the outaged 
transformer 38-37. Because of this, line 34-43 gets 
overloaded. Line 43-44 is the line adjacent to this interarea 
connection between area-1 and area-2.  Being a comparatively 
weak line, it gets heavily overloaded. Overloads are observed 
even in the central part of Area-2. This implies that the region 
of impact is considerably large. At this stage we actually have 
an overloading of a transformer 65-66 which is very close to 
the swing bus. This creates a critical situation. Most of the 
flows in Area-2 are from the East to the West. 
Outage of line 43-44 restricts the power transfer through 
the area interconnection 34-43. This stresses other inter-
connections and increases the severity of overloading of the 
previously overloaded lines. Now the heavy loads in Area-1 
are supplied through the northern interconnection between 
Area-1 and Area-2. Line 40-41 is the heaviest loaded line and 
it is responsible for the interarea power transfer in the 
northern region. One interesting observation is the 
overloading of one of the area interconnections between Area-
2 and Area3, due to the transformer outage in Area-1. This 
shows how the initial failure has spread throughout. 
Removal of line 40-41 also causes a similar effect of 
increasing the severity of the overloading. Naturally, line 40-
42 bears the brunt and gets overloaded to a dangerously high 
level. This outage also affects lines in the far eastern region of 
the system. Line 64-65 is a crucial line for supplying loads in 
that region. It gets overloaded in the process. One more 
dangerous consequence is the overloading of transformer at 
68-69. This is a crucial transformer, because it is connected to 
a large generator in the system. Finally, outage of line 40-42 
leads to a blackout. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
Even though the security criteria are met for N-0 and N-1 
conditions, a power system could be threatened by an 
impending blackout if certain conditions are forced on the 
system. Such conditions are created by cascading failures, 
some of which cannot be predicted either because they are 
random events or because of the current lack of intent on the 
planner’s part or the lack of computational power to look into 
every single event possibility under every single possible 
condition. One cannot blame the planner for lack of intent to 
analyze all different possibilities because, not all scenarios are 
probable. As for the current lack of computational capability, 
like a chess game, the power system can provide security 
scenarios that are combinatorially intractable, and therefore, 
such a task has never been undertaken. 
The work reported in this paper has investigated only the 
effect cascading failure conditions on the possibility of 
blackout. The events simulated were deemed to be probable 
from the perspective of the level of overloading. Although a 
line with the highest level of overloading may be picked to be 
the most likely line to fail under an emergency, it does not 
always happen this way as seen in many of the reported 
blackouts. Because of the preponderance of zone 3 backup 
relays and that of hidden failures, it is not unusual to see an 
underlying line close to the point of the initial disturbance to 
start the final cascading events that eventually lead to a 
blackout. 
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